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j

10773

BRIE~

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE PRE - TRIAL HEARING WAS NOT
A SUl\ilHARY JUDGl\IENT PROCEEDING.

In Respondent's Point I, it contends that the
Pre-Trial Court's holding on the First Cause of Action
Was proper because :Motions for Summary Judgment
1

and attached Affidavits had been filed by both sides.
Respondent is incorrect. The hearing was not a summary judgment proceeding, but as indicated on the
Pre-Trial Order, was a Pre-Trial hearing. (R. 70).
The Pre-trial Court's order would be equally erroneous if this had been a Summary Judgment proceeding since there were several factual disputes vital
to a determination of the issues which were not even
considered by the Court, or which could not have been
decided as a matter of law, in the absence of considerable evidence, to-wit: the areas of Waiver, Estoppel,
Arbitrariness, The State's prior agreement, and Breach
of Contract.
POINT II
EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL
AGAINST THE STATE.

IS AVAILABLE

At page 8 of its brief, Respondent contends that
the Doctrine of Estoppel will not be applied against
the State in the performance of its governmental func·
tions. This contention is without merit in our case.
"Governmental functions" and "proprietary func·
tions" are distinguished in cases involving the question
of Governmental immunity against suit; and a State
in performing these "governmental functions" is gen·
erally immune from suit in the absence of a statute
to the contrary.
Under the specific holding of Niblock v. Salt Lake
City, 100 Utah 573, Ill P 2d 800, and under the com·
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plete definition of "governmental function" established
in Cobia v. Roy City, 12 Utah 2d 375, 366 P 2d 986,
the State would probably be immune from suits involving the construction of highways - a governmental
function-in the absence of our statute. Of course,
Utah does have a statute waiving this immunity. See
Section 27-12-9 U.C.A., as amended and Section 63.30-5 U.C.A., as amended in 1965, which later section
provides: "Immunity from suit of all governmental
entities is waived as to any contractual obligation."
Therefore since governmental immunity is waived, it
cannot be used as a bar to estoppel, as Respondent
here attempts to do.

Respondent's cases cited at pages 8 and 9 are
clearly not in point, but rather involve either the question of the delegation of functions to various State
' highway departments, or situations where the person
against whom estoppel is being asserted had no authority to represent the State. Obviously, our case is materially different and can be summarized as follows:
1. The State waived immunity by statute.
2. The State entered into the construction con-

tract. ( R. 1, 9) .

3. The contract authorized the Chief Structural
Engineer for the State to agree on the rating of the
hammer ( R. 9), without the necessity of any writing.
4. Estoppel would lie against the State or the

Engineer to deny such an agreement.
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Respondent cites 1 A.L.R. 2d 347 as authority
that estoppel will not lie against the State. However,
that citation does not support respondent's contention,
and as a matter of fact, the rule is well established in
this annotation that a State may be estopped when the
acts of its officials, alleged to constitute the grounds
of estoppel, are done in the exercise of powers expressly
conferred by law and when acting within the scope
of their authority. 28 Am. Jur. 2d 786. Such is our case.
Respondent now raises on appeal and for the first
time in the case a question as to the authority of the
State to agree to the use of the D-12 Hammer on the
prior 21st South project. Such an argument at this
time is surprising indeed in view of the record in which
the State clearly admits that the use of the D-12 Hammer was permitted on the 21st South project. It must
follow that if the State permitted the use, that the
rating was acceptable and agreed to.
In its Answer, (R. 17) respondent admitted the
first three paragraphs of the plaintiff's Amended Com·
plaint. The Amended Complaint is set forth at Pages
9 through 12 of the record, and the original Complaint
at Pages 1 through 6. At Paragraph 4 of the Answer
appears the following admission by respondent:
"Defendant admits that the specifications for
a pile driver on the 21st overpass contract wer~
the same as those on the present contract ...
At Page 28 of the record is plaintiff's Interrogatory No. 6, which asks:
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"State whether or not the defendant permitted
the use of the plaintiff's Del Mag D-12 Hammer on the 21st South project, and give the name
of the Project Engineer for the State who permitted the use of said hammer."
At Page 143 of the record is the defendant's
answer:
"The State did not specifically agree to an
energy rating for the Contractor's Del Mag
D-1~ Hammer used on the 21st South project,
but did not question its use. The State's Project
Engineer on this work was Maurice Anderson.
Tolboe & Harlin Construction Company was
the Contractor."
See also paragraph 2 of the affadivit of William
P. Harlin (R. 53):
"That the defendant agreed to and had established a rating on the plaintiff's diesel hammer
prior to use on the subject project, and has
since agreed to its use and rating on similar jobs
in Salt Lake Valley on the same Interstate
Project with the sani.e plans and specifications."
Respondent, at page 11 of its brief, quotes only a
portion of the Appellant's Answer to the Respondent's Interrogatory No. l, and thus argues that Appellant has conclusively admitted a lack of authority
on the part of the State's employees to accept the prior
use of the Del Mag Hammer on the 21st South job.
However, the complete Answer should be noted, since
in its completeness, Appellant states

5

"The acceptance was oral and occurred br
reason of the fact that the defendant was i11._
formed of the use of the Del ~lag D-12 Hammer and the defendant permitted said use for the
entire pile driving portion of said project ... "
This Interrogatory, however, only refers to the
term acceptance used in Paragraph 4 of the Amended
Complaint ( R. I 0) . The balance of the allegations
of that Paragraph 4 clearly establish the basis for the
prior agreement as to the rating of the Del Mag D-12
Hammer.
Assuming, for purposes of argument that there
is a question as to whether or not the Project Engineer
had authority to act for the Chief Structural Engineer
in making the agreement as to the use of the Hammer,
such a question must be developed as a factual question, not as a conclusive legal admission, as is claimed
by Respondent.
The foregoing clearly indicates that Appellant's
claim of estoppel and its claim that the State had
agreed to the rating are legally sound. The facts from ,
respondent's most optimistic viewpoint are in contra·
versy. The matter should have been tried and not sum·
marily dismissed as a matter of law.
POINT III
BAD FAITH IS NOT A NECESSARY ELE·
MENT FOR BREACH OF CONTRACT UY
THE STATE.
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Respondent, beginning at page 15 of its brief,
argues exclusively that since Appellant admitted there
was no bad faith on the part of the Chief Structural
Engineer, there can be no recovery for breach of con, tract. This argument is untenable for the fallowing
reasons:
I. The Interrogatory in question only states:

(R. 147)

Attached to these Interrogatories marked Exhibit "A" is a copy of a report made by David
L. Sargent concerning these tests. Does plaintiff contend that this report of David L. Sargent
was made in bad faith?
The Answer-No.
Obviously there is no report attached to the Interrogatories, but we assume that it is the same report as
is attached to the Motion for Summary Judgment,
as pages 50-a, b of the Record. Just as clearly, the
report is undated but is subsequent to the action complained of. The arbitrary testing and rejection of
the Hammer, as well as the report, are here involved.
All of the circumstances must be considered in determining the answer to the problem-not just the making
of the report.
2. Admitting, for purposes of argument, that the
Engineer did not act in bad faith, Appellant claims
a breach of contract as a matter of law when the State
rrfuses to allow the specifications which prescribe the
lest for approval of the D-12 Hammer.
7

3. Lack of bad faith does not imply that the actions
of the State were not arbitrary. Arbitrariness and bad
faith are not used synonymously in cases of breach of
contract. Even Respondent's cases distinguish between
the two concepts, so that the absence of bad faith does
not mean the lack of arbitrariness.
Bad faith as such is a subjective thing imparting
a dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity. It evidences an "actual intent to mislead or deceive." Spi,egel
vs. Beacon Participations, 8 N.E. 2d 895. In this case,
the court defines "bad faith" as a mere actual state of
mind-not a technical term. Dishonesty and fraud
are synonymous with bad faith. Pabst Brewing Company vs. Nelson, 236 P. 873.
Arbitrariness on the other hand is the exercise of
discretion in such a manner after a consideration of
evidence, as clearly to indicate an action is based on
conclusions, such that reasonable men fairly and hon·
estly considering the evidence would reach contrary
conclusions. Greer vs. Susman, (Colo.) 298 P. 2d 948.
See also Miller vs. City of Tacoma, 378 P. 2d 464, 474.
This concept is better stated in Robertson vs. Cameron,
224 Fed. Supp. 60, 62. The Court holds that to bf
arbitrary or capricious, one must be without a reason·
sonable or rational basis, but one need not act in bad
faith.
" ... By arbitrary or capricious is not meant
that the refusal must be in bad faith. These
words are not used in their popular opprobious
significance. They are words of art and they
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mean merely that there must be a reasonable or
rational basis for the action of the superintendent. The superintendent may not act according
to his personal notion or whim no matter how
well intended or bona fide his action may be."
It is no excuse that the Structural Engineer may
have exercised his honest judgment. His actions on
behalf of the State are still arbitrary even though he
misconstrues his duties so that he can honestly say that
he was not acting in bad faith. His bad faith is a subjective criteria, but it does not extend to an objective
consideration of his actions and the actions of the State
in arbitrarily ref using to follow the specifications, and
in clearly breaching the contract by wrongfully rejecting the hammer for reasons not set forth in the specifications.

Furthermore, the alleged reasons were not proven
to be in any way indicative of the ability of the hammer to perform the contract. Such other reasons, if
they were valid under the contract specifications, should
have been subjected to proof, in view of the contention
of Appellant that the hammer did have the proper
raliug and could, if it had been permitted to function,
comply with all aspects of the specifications. Again,
we have a substantial factual issue, even taking the
State's most extreme position, that it had authority
to reject the hammer on some basis other than the
failure to agree upon a rating. Certainly the Pre-Trial
Court completely disregarded the other breach of contract issues by holding as a matter of law that Appellant couldn't recover. (R. 71).
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POINT IV.
APPELLANT'S AN S WE R TO INTER
ROGATORY NO. 3 IS NOT CONCLUSIVE.
Respondent, at Page 19, falls back upon the untrue
statement that "the admitted fact that nothing was
done by Appellant at that time," destroys Appellant's
allegation of arbitrary action. Such a narrow concept
of the interrogatory is unwarranted. Respondent
argues on the one hand that Appellant is held to an
admission "at that particular time" (R. 45) (Answer
3), and then on the other hand at Page 18 of its brief:
"The issues to whether Respondent's Chief
Structural Engineer acted arbitrarily must be
examined not only in light of the Chief Struc·
tural Engineer's knowledge and expertise, but
also in light of the total circumstances that sur·
round the rejection of Appellant's combustiontype hammer."
What difference does it make that Appellant at the
test was not sufficiently clairvoyant to fully advise the
State as to all possible reasons why the test was arbitrary. Suppose Appellant had not discovered how
arbitrary the rejection really was for months - does
this lessen the arbitrariness? Must a man discover
fraud at its inception, or all of the facts of arbitrariness
as they occur?
Prior to the test the State was informed of the only
facts then available. Only as the test began and as the
methods and conclusions were made apparent by the
State, did the full scope of the irrelevance and capri·
10
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cious nature of the test become known to the Contractor. Then, of course, he registered further objections, but all to no avail.

I

The arbitrary nature of the State's action was
implicit in its deliberate disregard of the energy rating,
and its avowed purpose, not to be concerned with that
rating. Therefore what else could the Contractor do,
either as a matter of fact, or of law, than what it did
do:
a. After the State and the Contractor had
entered into the contract, the State on June 3, for
the first time, questioned the manufacturer's rating.
of 22,500-foot pounds. (R. 74).
b. The Contractor asked for a short delay to
obtain further information in support of the manufacturer's rating, ( R. 74) and on June 7 in a
meeting with the State, the Contractor and its
Consulting Engineer further gave the State information to support the 22,500 rating, and that
this size and type of hammer was being used
throughout the Western states on Interstate
Highway projects. (R. 76).
On June 10, the Contractor and the special
engineer met with the State and raised various
questions concerning the forthcoming test. (R.
77, and letter dated June 13, 1963, following page
81 of the Record).
c~

!

d. The test was conducted in an arbitrary and
irrelevant manner, in that it did not prove any
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rating at all, the capability and rating of the com.
petitor's hammer was unknown, the tests were
merely to see which hammer could drive through
a dense layer and established nothing by way of
rating or compliance with the specifications, everyone present saw that the tests were inaccurate,
speculative and immaterial, (R. 44, 45, 50-a, 50-b,
53, 54, 55) and that the tests were conducted by
the State deliberately avoiding a determination
of the energy rating of Appellant's hammer.

The State was intent upon rejecting the hammer
for a fallacious and unsupported reason, to-wit, that
the competitor's hammer was larger and was undoubtedly going to be able to drive through a dense layer
of material much more easily than could the combustion-type hammer. That layer was below the contract·
required depth and far below the depth to which the
piles were ultimately driven on this project. The test
had absolutely no bearing on the rating nor on the
ability of the D-12 to comply with the specifications.
POINT V
A DD IT I 0 N AL ARGUMENTS WERE
SUBMITTED FOR CONSIDERATION A1
THE TIME OF TRIAL.
It is clear from an examination of the recor1
that additional arguments were presented at the tirn
of trial, which even more clearly indicated the inequit:
and the legal error, together with the manifest injustic
resulting from the failure to include the First Caus
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of Action in the trial of the law suit. Respondent's
Point III is not supported by the record. (R. 73-85,
VO, 91).

SUMMARY
Respondent seems to have presented nothing to
support the lower court's ruling, other than Respondent's version of the controverted facts. Why the trial
court relied upon an incomplete excerpt from the
Answers to interrogatories to rule as a matter of law
that Appellant could not recover on its First Cause
of action, and why Appellant should be precluded from
trying this cause of action because at the testing it
didn't inform the State of all of the facts going to
make up the arbitrary action by the State, when it
didn't know all of the facts, are still unanswered by
Respondent. It should not be necessary for the Respondent to rely upon an array of facts at this point
in our procedure. If such reliance is necessary, then
we should have had a trial of the issues. Both Appellant
and Respondent argue that many facts must be considered and yet the trial court decided as a matter of
law that no facts need be considered. Such a ruling
is an abuse of the trial court's discretion and is unsupported by any theory of law.
Respectfully submitted,
CLYDE, MECHAM & PRATT
ELLIOTT LEE PRATT
351 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorneys for Appellant
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